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IN THE 
OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACKAY & KNOBEL ENTERPRISES, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TETON VAN GAS, INC., a Corporation, 
VAN GAS, a Corporation, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11,555 
Suit for fire damages resulting from negligent installa-
tion of butane storage tank. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court dismissed complaint because corporate 
charter was suspended after suit was filed although 
charter was reinstated before denial of motion for new 
trial or to amend order of dismissal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order vacating the order dismissing 
its complaint and permitting the case to proceed to trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was filed to recover damages for the 
destruction of Plaintiff's service station building and 
equipment resulting from improper installation of butane 
tank without automatic or manual shut-off valves. A 
minor fire resulted in complete destruction of Plaintiff's 
property because the building was saturated with butane 
gas which could not be shut off. (R. 1-4). Plaintiff's cor-
porate charter was suspended six months after the 
complaint was filed by reason of non-payment of Utah 
Franchise Taxes. (R. 10, 26) but was reinstated before 
denial of plaintiff's motion to correct judgment or for a 
new trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss by reason of said 
suspension was granted by Judge Faux. 
Plaintiff's new counsel filed a motion to amend or 
correct the order or for a new trial. Judge Faux denied 
the motion, concluding that repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, 
and adoption of 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, as 
a part of the Utah Business Corporation Act without 
amending 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, concerning suspension 
of corporate charters for non-payment of corporation 
franchise taxes, left plaintiff without power to sue in 
connection with the winding up of its affairs (R. 67, 68). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUSPENSION OF CORPORATE CHARTER FOR NON· 
PAYMENT OF FRANCHISE TAXES DOES NOT AF· 
FECT ITS RIGHT TO SUE IN CONNECTION WITH 
WINDING UP OF ITS AFFAIRS. 
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The sole issue in this case it whether a corporation may 
bring a lawsuit to wind up its affairs after its corporate 
charter has been suspended. 
(a) Rights of "suspended" corporation under prior 
law. 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, reads in part as follows: 
"If a tax computed and levied hereunder is not paid 
... the corporate powers, rights and privileges of the 
delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, 
shall be suspended ... " (Emphasis added) 
16-1-2, UCA, 1953, of the act as it existed prior to its 
repeal when the Utah Business Corporation Act was 
adopted read in part as follows: 
"Any corporation organized under the laws of ... 
Utah whose franchise ... may ... expire by ... for-
feiture, or by dissolution by decree of court may 
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding uµ 
its affairs; and to effect this purpose may ... sue 
and be sued, contract, and exercise all other inci-
dental and necessary powers. (emphasis added) 
A long line of Utah case establish the rule that a cor-
poration whose charter has been "suspended" as pro-
vided in 59-13-61, UCA, 1953, or "forfeited" as provided 
in the prior statute could engage in limited business activ-
ities to wind up its affairs and could sue and be sued in 
connection therewith. Some of those cases are as follows: 
(1) In Houston v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power 
Co., 55 U. 393, 187 P. 174 (1919) the Court acknowledge 
the right of a corporation whose charter had been "for-
feited" under prior law wind up its affairs, but did not 
authorize it to engage in new business. 
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(2) In Consolidated Mills & Feed Yards Co. v. Patter. 
son, 62 U. 506, 221 P. 159 (1923) corporate officers were 
held personally liable for new debts incurred by cor-
poration after its charter had been "forfeited" for non-
payment of taxes. 
(3) In Henroid v. East Tintic Development Co., 52 
U. 245, 173 P. 134, (1918), the Court held that the statute 
contemplated that the board should wind up the cor-
porate affairs in a case where the corporate charter and 1 
right to conduct business were "forfeited." 
( 4) In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P. 
2d 741, the Court held that service on director of a cor· 
poration whose charter had been "suspended" gave juris- i 
diction over the corporation, though the director had 1 
never been authorized by charter, by-laws or court ap-
pointment to act as agent for the stockholders. 
(b) Judge Faux has ruled that "suspended" corpor-
ation has no right to sue to assist in winding up its 
affairs. 
Judge Faux has held that the right of a corporation to 
sue in connection with winding up of its affairs no longer 
exists by reason of the repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, in 
connection with adoption of the Utah Business Corpor· 1 
ation Act. That act has provisions which are similar to ! 
the old 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, but which do not specifically 
deal with "suspended" corporations, and which read in 
part as follows: 
( c) Rights of "dissolved" corporation under present 
law. 
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16-10-100. SURVIVAL OF REMEDY AFTER DIS-
SOLUTION. 
"The dissolution of a corporation either ( 1) by the 
issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the Secre-
tary of State, or (2) by a decree of court when the 
court has not liquidated the assets and business of 
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by ex-
piration of its period of duration, shall not take away 
or impair any remedy available to or against the 
corporation ,its directors, officers, or shareholders, 
for any right or claim existing, or any liability in-
curred, prior to such dissolution if action or other 
proceedings thereon is commenced within two years 
after the date of such dissolution. Any such action or 
proceeding by or against the corporation may be 
prosecuted or def ended by the corporation in its cor-
porate name ... " (Emphasis added) 
16-10-101. SURVIVAL OF CORPORATE ENTITY 
AFTER DISSOLUTION. "Notwithstanding the dis-
solution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of 
a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, 
or (2) by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of 
its period of duration, the corporate existence of such 
corporation shall nevertheless continue for the pur-
pose of winding up its affairs in respect to any prop-
erty and assets which have not been distributed or 
otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, and 
to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or 
otherwise dispose of such property, sue and be sued, 
contract and exercise all other incidental and neces-
sary powers." (Emphasis added) 
It is clear that if an actual dissolution of the corporation 
has occurred the corporation could sue on a claim that 
arose prior to dissolution. Falcanaero Enterprise, Inc. v. 
Valley Investment Co., 16 U, 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1964). 
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The new statutes, however, fail to deal directly with the 
status of a corporation whose charter has been "sus-
pended" for non-payment of corporate franchise tax. 
(d) Status of "suspended" corporation under present ' 
law. 
Rule 65B(b) (1), URCP, authorizes suit against a cor-
poration whose charter has been "suspended," and there-
by recognizes that such a corporation has power to ' 
defend a lawsuit. It would seem that if a corporation has 
power to defend a lawsuit that it also has the power to 
file a counterclaim and/or the power to commence a law-
suit for purposes of winding up its affairs. The public 
policy announced by 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, , 
quoted above, appears to be that corporate existence 
should continue for purposes of effecting an orderly 
winding up of the affairs of the corporation, disposition 
of claims and lawsuit, etc. even though the very existence 
of the corporation has been terminated. Some other 
courts that have dealt with similar problems have con-
cluded that a corporation whose charter has been "sus-
pended" can still sue to wind up its affairs: 
( 1) In Montana Valley Land Co. v. Bestul, 253 P. 2d 
325 (Montana), the Court held that a corporation whose 
charter has been suspended for nonpayment of taxes is 
not completely dead but has sufficient life to be a 
repository for title to real estate, and may sue or defend, 
if, under statute, it is entitled to reinstatement at any 
time and hence is not dissolved. (In our case the cor· 
porate charter has in fact been reinstated). 
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(2) In Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham (Wyoming), 
109 P. 2d 463, 110 P. 2d 824, the Court held that a cor-
poration could bring an action, after its dissolution by a 
proclamation of the governor by reason of failure to pay 
annual tax provided by law, in its corporate name for 
the use of persons entitled to receive the proceeds of such 
action. 
(3) In Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Rivers 
(Idaho), 398 P. 2d 63, the Court held that a corporation 
does not die by becoming delinquent for failure to pay 
annual tax as does natural person or corporation whose 
term of existence has terminated, but is rather in a state 
of suspended animation from which condition it can be 
relieved by paying statutory penalties. 
( 4) California law expressly prohibits a corporation 
whose charter has been suspended for failure to pay cor-
poration tax, however even under those circumstances 
the court has permitted reinstatement of the charter 
while a suit was pending and has permitted the matter 
to proceed to trial. Pac. Atlantic Wine v. Duccini, 245 
P. 2d 622, 111 C.A.2d 957; Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Superior Ct., 91 Cal. App. 356, 267 P. 169. 
( 5) In Eagle Oil Corp. v. Cohassett Oil Corp., 263 
Mich. 371, 248 NW 840 the Court held that the lower court 
properly allowed the corporation which was in default 
for failure to pay its privilege tax at the time of the hear-
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ing of the case to cure such default by payment of the 
required fee. 
(6) See also annotation at 6 ALR 3d 341, Sec. 8. 
The intention of the legislature appears to have been 
to continue existing procedures and rights so far as 
practicable in adopting the Utah Business Corporation 1 
Act, as indicated by 16-10-143, UCA, 1953, which reads 
in part as follows: 
"The repeal of a prior law by this act shall not affect 
any right accrued or established, or any liability in-
1 
curred, or any action or proceeding begun under the 
provisions of such law prior to the repeal thereof 
... " (Emphasis added) 
The right of a corporation whose charter had been 
"suspended" to bring legal action to wind up its affairs 
was a right that had been "established" prior to the en-
actment of the Utah Business Corporation Act, and since 
that act does not expressly prohibit a corporation whose 
charter has been "suspended" from using the courts to 
wind up its affairs, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
legislature intended that the existing and "established" 
procedure and "right" to use the courts in winding up its 
affairs would be continued. The Model Business Corpor-
ation after which the Utah Act was patterned simply did 
not make provision for the conduct of the affairs of a 
corporation whose charter has been "suspended" for non-
payment of taxes. Where the legislature has failed to pro-
vide a procedure for disposition of the corporate assets 
and the winding up of the corporate affairs in case of a 
"suspension" the Court is free to follow judicial precedent 
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and to use established procedures in winding up the af-
fairs of such a corporation. 
If the current law were to be construed as counsel for 
Defendant and Judge Faux have construed it, if a cor-
poration merely fails to pay its franchise tax its charter 
may be "suspended." If the delinquency continues for a 
longer period the more severe penalty of involuntary 
dissolution in an action filed by the Attorney General 
may be imposed, as provided in 16-10-89, UCA, 1953, 
which reads in part as follows: 
"A corporation may be dissolved involuntarily by a 
decree of the district court in an action filed by the 
Attorney General when it is established that: 
(a) ... its corporate powers, rights and privileges 
have been suspended as provided in 59-13-61; " 
(Emphasis added) 
Even after the more severe penalty of dissolution has 
been imposed as the result of a long continued delin-
quency in payment of tax, the corporation still has power 
under 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, UCA, 1953, (quoted 
above) to sue and to do other limited acts in connection 
with the winding up of its affairs. It is unreasonable to 
conclude that the legislature intended that a corporation 
whose charter has merely been "suspended" but has not 
had the more severe penalty of involuntary dissolution 
imposed upon it would have less power to wind up its 
affairs than a corporation whose very existence had been 
terminated by involuntary dissolution. 
(e) Public policy requires orderly winding up of the 
affairs of a "suspended" corporation. 
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Public policy in preserving the rights of creditors stock-
holders, and other persons interested in or whose rights 
1 
are affected by the "suspended" corporation requires that 
the affairs and assets of that corporation be wound up in 
an orderly fashion. If such a corporation has no power 
to sue, it probably has no other power to sell or otherwise 
assemble and dispose of its assets or affairs. The result 
of such a situation would be complete chaos and would 
probably reult in a windfall and wrongful appropriation 
of corporate assets by persons not otherwise entitled 
thereto. In our situation such a rule will confer upon the 
Defendants immunity for their wrongful acts and will 
deny to Plaintiff, its creditors and stockholders the right 
to recover their one remaining valuable asset, to-wit, a 
claim against the Defendants for destruction of the cor-
porate assets and property. 
The protection of revenue to the State of Utah does not 
require such extreme measures. Merely terminating of 
the right of the corporation to enter into new business 
transactions appears to have been the intent of 59-13-61 
and 59-13-62, UCA, 1953. 
The policy of the law is to determine lawsuits on their 
merits and not a mere technicality such as the non-
payment of a tax revenue to the State of Utah. See • 
Kirkham v. Spencer, 3 U. 2d 399, 285 P. 2d 127. Rule 1, 
URCP. 19 Am Jur 2d 1009, Sec. 1662, etc. Under 78-12-40, 
UCA, 1953, Plaintiff is entitled to commence a new law-
suit against Defendants on the same facts since the failure 
of this lawsuit is not on the merits, which statute reads in 
part as follows: 
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"If any action is commenced within due time and ... 
the Plaintiff fails in such action . . . otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited by law ... for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the Plain-
tiff .. . may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure." (Emphasis added) 
To permit the dismissal of this action on a technicality 
only to refile as provided in the above statute, is a use-
less act, particularly where (as in our case) the techni-
cality has been remedied by reinstatement of the cor-
porate charter and payment of taxes and penalties prior 
to denial of Plaintiff's motions. 
(f) Duties of directors of "suspended" corporation. 
In Consolidated Mills & Feed Yards Co. v. Patterson, 
(1923), 62 U. 506, 221 P. 159 the Court stated: 
"where a corporation's charter is forfeited in this 
state, it is the duty of the directors, who are trustees 
for the stockholders and creditors, to assemble its 
assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and generally con-
duct its affairs in such manner as will properly ex-
pedite the winding up of the corporation's business." 
The directors still have those same duties under the 
current law but must have access to the court to properly 
carry out their duties. 
SUMMARY 
Repeal of 16-1-2, UCA, 1953, which dealt with the 
power of a corporation whose charter had been "for-
feited" to wind up its affairs but makes no mention of a 
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"suspended" charter and adoption of 16-10-100 and 16-
10-101, UCA, 1953, as a part of the Utah Business Cor-
poration Act which provides for suits by and winding up 
affairs of "dissolved" corporations and which also makes 
no mention of the right of a corporation whose charter 
has been "suspended" to wind up its affairs does not 
prohibit Plaintiff whose charter was "suspended" after 
the suit was started from continuing this lawsuit filed in 
connection with the winding up of its affairs, particularly 
where the charter was in fact reinstated prior to denial 
by Judge Faux of motion to correct judgment and for a 
new trial. 
Public policy requires that the rights of creditors, 
stockholders and others in a corporation whose charter 
is "suspended" be protected from wrongful appropriation, 
and that the affairs of such a corporation be liquidated 
and wound up in an orderly fashion, rather than by a 
scrambling for possession based upon a technicality. De-
fendant should not be permitted to reap a windfall and 
to escape responsibility for its misconduct which 
destroyed substantially all of the assets of the Plaintiff 
because of poor draftsmanship by the legislature or a 
technicality. 
The pending lawsuit should be permitted to go to trial 
on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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